In this work, we investigate the capacity of private information retrieval (PIR) from N replicated databases, where a subset of the databases are byzantine. We allow for multiround queries and demonstrate that the identities of the byzantine databases can be determined with a small additional download cost. As a result, the capacity of the multi-round PIR with byzantine databases (BPIR) reaches that of the robust PIR problem when the number of byzantine databases is less than the number of trustworthy databases.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of preserving the identity of the data the user retrieved from the databases is called the private information retrieval (PIR) problem, which was introduced by Chor et. al. [1] . In the PIR problem in [1] , the user wants to retrieve a certain bit from N replicated databases without revealing which bit is of interest to any single database. The main objective is to optimize the communication efficiency, which includes minimizing the upload and download cost. The problem was reformulated in [2] from an information-theoretic perspective, where the user wants to retrieve one of K sufficiently large messages from the databases so that only the download cost is minimized. This problem was fully solved in [2] , where the capacity of the PIR problem is
which is defined as the ratio of the desired message size and the total number of downloaded symbols from the databases. The capacity increases with the number of databases N , since with the help of more databases, we can hide the privacy of the user better from any single database. Many interesting extensions and variations for the PIR problem have since then been studied. While most works are based on the assumption that the databases provide the correct answers to the user's query, some consider the case where not all of the databases are compliant, and furthermore, the set of databases that are not compliant is not known to the user when sending its query. The first set of problems in this category is the robust PIR (RPIR) problem [3] , where a subset of databases with size B are silent and do not respond to the queries. In this case, the goal of the user is to design its query such that the download cost is minimized, the privacy of the user is preserved, and most importantly, the desired message can be correctly decoded based only on the answers of the databases that do respond. The capacity of RPIR is [3] 
Comparing (2) with (1), we see that the capacity of the RPIR is as if the number of databases is reduced from N to N − B, i.e., the effective number of databases is N − B. Variants of the RPIR problem has been studied for coded databases [4] , [5] , and universal scenarios [6] .
The second set of problems in this category is the PIR problem from byzantine databases (BPIR). The informationtheoretic formulation of the BPIR problem was proposed in [7] , where a subset of databases with size B may introduce arbitrary errors to the answers of the user's query. In this case, the goal of the user is to design queries such that the download cost is minimized, the privacy of the user is preserved, and most importantly, the user can decode the desired message correctly despite the arbitrary wrong answers from the byzantine databases. The capacity of the BPIR problem was found in [7] and is given by
Comparing (3) with (1) and (2), we see that, the number of effective databases is N − 2B, i.e., even though there are only B byzantine databases, it is as if 2B databases are offering no information to the user. Note that the penalty term N −2B N comes from the fact that all N databases send answers, though only the answers from N −2B databases are useful. We do not have the penalty term of N −B N in the RPIR problem because the silent databases do not send any data. Variations of the BPIR problem, which include collusion and coded storage have been studied in [5] , [8] .
There is a connection between the RPIR problem and the BPIR problem, in that if the user knows the identity of the B databases who do not respond truthfully, the user can simply ignore the answers from these databases and the problem becomes the RPIR problem. Thus, if the user can be given "some help" in identifying the set of byzantine databases, the number of effective databases would increase from N − 2B to N − B. This help does not need to be much, compared to the download cost, as there are only N B possibilities for the set of byzantine databases, while the download cost of a sufficiently large message scales linearly with the message length. Based on this idea, [9] formulated a variant of the BPIR problem where the databases offer this "little help" to the user. More specifically, in their problem formulation, the databases are all trustworthy, and there is a byzantine third party, who can listen in on the answers of E databases, and has the ability to arbitrarily change the answers of B databases. In this case, as long as the databases can hide some transmitted information to the user from the adversary and -error is allowed [9] , the byzantine databases may be identified and the capacity of the BPIR problem reaches that of the RPIR problem, i.e., the number of effective databases is N − B, rather than N − 2B.
In this paper, we follow the problem formulation of [7] , i.e., a subset of the databases are byzantine, and explore how the user may identify the byzantine databases on its own. We remove the assumption of single-round communication between the user and the databases in [7] , and allow for multirounds of queries in the sense that the current round of queries can depend on the answers from the databases in the previous rounds. In the proposed achievability scheme, while the first round deals with the basic file transmission, further rounds are aimed at finding the identities of the byzantine databases. At least one byzantine database will be caught in each round, so at most B + 1 rounds are needed. We find the capacity of the multi-round BPIR problem and show that by allowing multiple rounds, we can indeed increase the effective number of databases from N − 2B to N − B, and thus, decrease the download cost significantly. This is in contrast with the classic PIR problem, where multi-rounds does not increase the capacity [10] .
II. SYSTEM MODEL Consider the problem where K messages are stored on N replicated databases. The K messages, denoted as W 1 , · · · , W K , are independent and each message consists of L symbols, which are independently and uniformly distributed over a finite field F q , where q is the size of the field.
A user wants to retrieve message W θ , θ ∈ [K], by sending designed queries to the databases. Unlike in most of the previous PIR literature, for example [2] - [9] , where the queries are designed and fixed prior to receiving any answers from the databases, here we consider the case where the queries are allowed to be multi-round, which means that the user can design the queries based on the databases' responses in the previous rounds. More specifically, when W θ is the desired message, the query sent to the n-th databese in Round m is denoted as Q
where M is the total number of rounds. Since the queries may only depend on the answers from the databases in the previous rounds,
Database n in Round m, upon receiving the query Q n,m , calculates the correct answer, denoted asĀ [θ] n,m , based on the queries received in this round Q [θ] n,m and the messages W 1:K ,
In the BPIR setting considered in this paper, there exists a set of byzantine databases B, where |B| = B, who are untrustworthy. The remaining databases in [N ] \ B are trustworthy. Hence, the trustworthy databases will transmit to the user the correct answer A
n,m , n ∈ [N ] \ B, while the byzantine databases will replace the correct answerĀ [θ] n,m with an arbitrary deterministic sequenceã [θ] n,m of the same size, and send it back to the user, i.e., A
The queries need to be designed such that the user is able to reconstruct the desired message W θ after M rounds no matter what arbitrary answers the byzantine databases provide, i.e.,
To protect the privacy of the user, we require that ∀n ∈ [N ],
The rate of the BPIR problem, denoted as R, is defined as the ratio between the message size L and the total downloaded information from the databases in the worst case, i.e.,
.
(4)
The capacity of the BPIR problem is C multi BPIR = sup R over all possible retrieval schemes. Note that since the databases can respond arbitrarily, it does not matter whether the databases in B coordinate or not in responding to the user.
III. MAIN RESULT
The main result of the paper is establishing the capacity of the multi-round BPIR problem. Theorem 1. The capacity of the multi-round BPIR problem is
Comparing (5) with the capacity for the RPIR problem and the single-round BPIR problem, i.e., (2) and (3), we see that 1) When 2B +1 < N , by allowing multi-round, the number of effective databases has increased from N − 2B, which is the case for single-round BPIR, to N −B, which is the same as the RPIR problem. An example of the reduction of the normalized download cost, which is the inverse of the capacity, is shown in Fig. 1 (a) . 2) When 2B + 1 = N , by allowing multi-round, the download cost is significantly reduced since in a single-round BPIR, the only possible scheme was to download all the messages from all the databases. An example of the normalized download cost reduction is shown in Fig. 1 (b) . 3) When 2B + 1 > N , allowing multi-round does not help, as the majority of the databases are untrustworthy and there are error instances introduced by the byzantine databases where correct decoding at the user is impossible. Note that under the problem formulation of [9] , where the databases are all trustworthy and a third-party is performing the byzantine attack, even when 2B + 1 > N , the user can still correctly decode the desired message with the databases' help, that is hidden from the byzantine third-party.
The achievability proof of Theorem 1 is given in the next section, where the B byzantine databases are identified by the multi-round queries. The converse proof, which is more trivial, can be found in the extended version of this paper [11] and is omitted here due to limited space.
IV. ACHIEVABILITY
We will first provide the main idea of the achievability scheme. The proposed scheme is performed in several rounds. In the first round, the message is cut into blocks, and for each block we use the query structure of the RPIR scheme [3] . While the answers in this round contain arbitrary errors introduced by the byzantine databases, due to the error detecting capability of linear block codes, the user is able to detect the set of blocks that contain errors, which we call the error blocks. In the following rounds, say Round m, m ≥ 2, the user re-request one error block using an MDS code whose rate is small enough for the errors in the answers of Round m to be corrected. By comparing the corrected data received in Round m to the answers of this error block in Round 1, at least one of the byzantine databases will be identified. After at most B + 1 rounds, the user can identify all of the byzantine databases that introduced errors in Round 1. Ignoring the answers from these byzantine databases, the user can decode the desired message correctly from the answers in Round 1. Since the message length is sufficiently long, which means that the number of blocks is sufficiently large, the extra download cost in the rounds after Round 1 is negligible. Next, we provide a motivating example.
Consider the case of retrieving with privacy one of two messages from six databases. Two of the six databases are byzantine. The message length is L = (N − B) K l = 16l. Each message is cut into l blocks. Let the 16 × 1 vectors x j 1 and x j 2 denote the block j of W 1 and W 2 , respectively. Assume without loss of generality that W 1 is the desired message. 
where S 2 ([1 : 4], :) denotes the first 4 rows of S 2 . We note here that the random matrices S 1 , S 2 and the MDS code are the same for each block. As shown in Table I , the first stage of the query structure is to retrieve single symbols. The second stage involves using the undesired message as side information to receive 2sum symbols. Since there are two byzantine databases, three independent undesired symbols from another three databases can be utilized in the second stage for each database. 
Round 1 ends when the answers for all l blocks are received by the user. Note that the scheme described above for each block is the same as the query scheme of the RPIR problem for the entire message [3] . Thus, similar to the case of RPIR, the transmission of Block j is private, and so is the transmission of the entire Round 1.
Analyzing received data after Round 1: For Block j, the user first looks at the retrieved single symbols of the undesired message, i.e., b j [1 :6] . b j [1:6] is a (24,4)-MDS code with a sequence of length p = 18 removed. Since the removed length p < 24 − 4, the punctured code is still an MDS code, i.e., b j [1:6] is a (6, 4)-MDS code, capable of detecting up to two errors, which is the maximum number of errors the byzantine databases can introduce in b j [1:6] . If errors are detected in b j [1:6] , Block j is declared an error block of Round 1.
If no error was found in b j [1:6] , the four symbols of S 2 ([1 : 4], :)x j 2 can be decoded, and the user calculates b j 7 to b j 24 using (7) . b j 7 to b j 24 is then subtracted from the received 2sum symbols in Stage 2 and we are left with a j [7:24] . Since a j [1:24] is a (24,16)-MDS code, and the number of errors the two byzantine databases can introduce is less than 8, the user can detect if any error is introduced by the byzantine databases in a j [1:24] . If errors are detected, Block j is declared an error block of Round 1.
We repeat the above procedure for each of the l blocks. At the end of the procedure, denote the set of error blocks of Round 1 as E 1 . We have one of the two following cases: 1) E 1 = φ, i.e., no error was found on any of the blocks, which means that the byzantine databases did not attack in Round 1. No further rounds are needed. The user proceeds to the final decoding step.
2) |E 1 | ≥ 1, which means that the byzantine databases attacked in Round 1. Further rounds are needed.
Transmission in Round 2: the user uniformly picks one block out of the |E 1 | blocks with detected error, say Block j 1 , and performs the following encoding: map the 16 symbols of and b j1 [1:24] with the answers for Block j 1 received from the six databases in Round 1, and the errors introduced by the byzantine databases in Round 1 can be identified. We have one of the following two cases: 1) Both byzantine databases introduced an error in Block j 1 . In this case, the user can identify both byzantine databases. No further rounds are needed. The user proceeds to the final decoding step.
2) Only one of the byzantine databases introduced an error in Block j 1 . In this case, the user can identify one of the byzantine databases, say Database y 1 . For all the blocks in E 1 , i.e., the blocks detected with errors in Round 1, we ignore the answers from the byzantine database identified, i.e., Database y 1 , and detect whether there are still errors in the blocks in E 1 . This detection procedure is the same as that after Round 1, i.e., for each j ∈ E 1 , we first detect to see if the b j ignoring the answer from the identified byzantine database is a (20,16)-MDS code, and at most 4 errors can be introduced by the unidentified byzantine database, the introduced errors will be detected. If errors are detected, Block j is an error block of Round 2. Denote the set of error blocks as E 2 . We have one of the following two cases: 1) E 2 = φ, which means that the other byzantine database never introduced any error in Round 1. No further rounds are needed. The user proceeds to the final decoding step.
2) |E 2 | ≥ 1, which means that the other uncaught byzantine database introduced errors in the blocks belonging to E 2 . We need Round 3 to catch the unidentified byzantine database. Transmission in Round 3: uniformly and randomly pick one of the blocks in E 2 , say Block j 2 . Repeat the query procedure described in Round 2 for Block j 1 , replacing j 1 with j 2 . Upon receiving the 96 answers of Round 3, similar to Round 2, the identity of the uncaught byzantine database will be revealed to the user. By now, the user has caught both Byzantine databases. No further rounds are needed.
Final Decoding: the user has identified all the byzantine databases that introduced errors in Round 1. The user examines the data received in Round 1 and ignores the answers from the identified byzantine databases. Similar to the RPIR problem, each block of the desired message can be correctly decoded.
Thus, for this example, we have proposed a query scheme that allows the user to decode the desired message, irrespective of the errors introduced by the byzantine databases. It is easy to see that the scheme is private, not only in Round 1, but in the entire query process, displaying no preference over Message 1 or 2. Finally, the download cost in the worst case is 30l + 192 when 3 rounds are needed. Thus, the BPIR achievable rate is lim l→∞ 16l 30l+192 = 8 15 , consistent with Theorem 1.
B. General Scheme
This scheme is for the case 2B + 1 ≤ N . Suppose each message consists of L = (N − B) K · l symbols from F q , and W θ is the desired message. Each message is cut into l blocks. Let the j-th block of Message k be denoted as a vector
Transmission in Round 1: We construct the queries of each block using the achievable scheme of robust PIR for the entire message [3, Section IV]. In [3] , N out of M databases respond and any T databases may collude. For our problem, we use the query scheme of [3, Section IV] with M replaced by N , N replaced by N − B and T = 1. The notation x
. Due to limited space, the details will not be explained here but can be found in [11] .
Analyzing received data after Round 1: After all l blocks are received in Round 1, the user examines the data of each block for error.
For Block j, the user first looks at the received undesired symbols. For If no error was found in the undesired symbols of Block j, by subtracting the undesired symbol, the user can obtain the desired symbols mixtures, i.e., u j θ,K , for all K that contain θ. Since an (N (N − B) K−1 , (N − B) K )-MDS code is used for the desired symbols, where at most B(N − B) K−1 errors are introduced by the byzantine databases, if any byzantine databases introduced errors in the desired symbol mixtures, the user can detect them. If errors are detected in the desired symbols, we say Block j is an error block of Round 1.
We repeat the above procedure for each of the l blocks. At the end of the procedure, denote the set of error blocks of Round 1 as E 1 . Depending on the actions of the byzantine databases, we have one of the following two cases:
1) E 1 = φ, which means that no error was introduced in Round 1 by the byzantine databases. No further rounds are needed. The user proceeds to the final decoding step. 2) |E 1 | ≥ 1, which means that some byzantine databases introduced errors in Round 1. Further rounds are performed according to the following iterative procedure.
At 
. By retrieving the whole block of all messages, queries in Round m do not conflict with the previous rounds in terms of privacy. The maximum number of errors introduced by the byzantine databases is Bα for each message, which is less than
Thus, irrespctive of the errors the byzantine databases introduce in Round m for Block j m−1 , the correct symbols can be decoded.
Analyzing received data after Round m: With the correct symbols of Block j m−1 decoded, the user can calculate the correct answers for Block j m−1 in Round 1, and compare it with the actual received symbols of Block j m−1 in Round 1. Since Block j m−1 is an error block of Round m − 1, it means that at least one of the unidentified byzantine databases has made errors in Block j m−1 of Round 1. Hence, with the comparison, at least one of the byzantine databases not caught in the previous rounds will be caught in this round. Denote the number of byzantine databases caught in Round m as n m .
The user finds the set of error blocks of Round m, i.e., E m , as follows: for each of the error blocks of E m−1 , detect if there are still errors after ignoring the answer from the byzantine databases whose identity has been discoverd thus far. This error detection can be done as we are looking at the ( Hence, these errors can be detected. Denote the set of blocks where errors still exist as E m . We have the following two cases: 1) E m = φ, which means that the user has found out the identity of all byzantine databases that introduced errors in Round 1. No further rounds are needed. The user proceeds to the final decoding step. 2) |E m | ≥ 1, which means that there are still uncaught byzantine databases who introduced errors in Round 1. In this case, the user starts the query for Round m + 1 by repeating the above procedure.
Final Decoding: We have identified all the byzantine databases that introduced errors in Round 1. The user decodes by ignoring their answers. Since the query structure of Round 1 resembles that of the RPIR where N −B databases respond, we can correctly decode the desired message, ignoring the answers from the identified byzantine databases. Now we calculate the achievable rate. The downloaded symbols for each block in Round 1 is N · K k=1 (N −B−1) k−1 K k , according to the RPIR problem [3, Section IV]. Starting from Round m, m ≥ 2, KN α symbols are downloaded in each round. In the worst case, the user needs B rounds to catch all the B byzantine databases. Hence, the achievable rate of the multi-round BPIR scheme proposed, according to (4) , is
In other words, from Round 2 to Round B (worst case), only one block of message is requested each round, and this download cost is negligible when the number of blocks go to infinity.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we obtain the capacity of the multi-round BPIR problem. We show that with multi-round queries, the identities of the byzantine databases can be determined by the user, and as a result, the capacity of the BPIR problem is equal to that of the RPIR problem when the number of byzantine databases is less than half of the total number of databases. Thus, in face of byzantine databases, a multi-round query structure can indeed decrease the download cost significantly, compared to single-round queries.
